Bruno Kern
The
potential of renewable energies and efficiency technologies is generally
limited and cannot maintain the current level of consumption. In the future, we
will have to cope with much less net energy. The restructuring of the economy
in the rich industrialized countries must therefore be accompanied by a
consistent, solidary dismantling. Consistent regulatory measures can initiate
this inevitable process of shrinkage.
Dismantling
instead of conversion
The talk of the
ecological "restructuring" of industrial society has meanwhile become
a commonplace across all political camps. It is assumed that we achieve the
necessary reductions and ultimately CO2 neutrality solely by means
of more efficient technical processes and that we can easily substitute the energy
that has so far come from fossil sources with renewable energies. However, if
you calculate seriously, you will come to the conclusion that a conversion must
inevitably go hand in hand with dismantling, that we must drastically reduce
the absolute consumption of energy and other resources. Actually, common sense
tells you: Renewable energy sources have a much lower energy density than
fossil fuels, they have a limited potential and their honestly calculated
energy balance is rather sobering.
The endenergy consumption
in Germany, which in addition to electricity (it currently accounts for only 20
%), includes room heating, transport, process energy, etc., currently amounts
to 2,500 TWh per year. A study commissioned by the WWF has calculated that a potential
of renewable energies could be exploited in Germany that provides little more
than 700 TWh (WWF 2019, 9). After all, that would be significantly more than
twice as much of the amount of electricity that comes from renewable sources
today. Even if there are somewhat more optimistic estimations here and there,
there is a large gap between our current energy consumption and what is
theoretically available to us from domestic renewable sources. The conversion
of the chemical industry at today's level to decarbonised processes alone
requires an additional electricity demand of 685 TWh, significantly more than
we generate today in total electricity (DECHEMA / FutureCamp 2019, 9), the
conversion to green steel and the replacement of gas and oil heating systems
with heat pumps mean a further additional electricity demand of at least 250
TWh, etc.
In the meantime, the oath
of disclosure has long since been taken. Especially those who have persistently
invoked the possibility of a one hundred percent supply of renewable energies
in recent decades apparently assume that we will be dependent on natural gas
for decades to come and will have to import huge amounts of hydrogen if we want
to maintain our level of industrialization. The conversion of our steel production,
fuel cells for ships, buses, trucks, aircraft, electricity storage, etc.
requires quantities of hydrogen, which – as most scenarios assume – we will
have to obtain about 80 % from other countries (Kreutzfeld 2022). However, even
in countries with the most favourable conditions for solar and wind power, the
corresponding potential is not unlimited, and in many cases there is a lack of
freshwater as a resource indispensable for the production of green hydrogen in
the very areas that are most interesting for Europe in this respect (North and
West Africa)! Our greed for the "champagne of the energy transition"
comes at the expense of the immediate living conditions of the people in the
potential exporting countries. A new imperialism under green auspices and a
dangerous global competition for hydrogen as a resource as well as for other
non-renewable raw materials (lithium, cobalt, graphite, neodymium, etc.) that
are indispensable for renewable energies and processes are already emerging.
Renewable
does not mean inexhaustible
Not least under the
pressure of the Ukraine war, the expansion of renewable energies is currently
being pushed forward. However, this cannot change the fundamentally limited
potential. In addition, the expansion of the corresponding plants together with
the necessary infrastructure is initially associated with a considerable input
of energy and resources and with corresponding emissions. In a situation in
which the CO2 budget still available to us will be exhausted in just
a few years, we are therefore dealing with a "material rebound" of
considerable proportions precisely due to the accelerated expansion of
renewable energies. The installation of a wind turbine alone, which meets today's
standard (with a capacity of about 3.5 MW), consumes – in addition to rare
earths such as neodymium for the generator – about 150 tons of steel and also
requires a 2000-ton reinforced concrete base.
The public debate is
currently suggesting that only bureaucratic obstacles need to be removed in
order to advance the expansion of renewable energies. The fundamentally limited
potential is obscured.[1]
Take photovoltaik, for
example: it currently contributes about 9 % to the electric power supply and
will continue to play a rather subordinate role in Germany in the future. It is
the renewable form of energy that initially requires the largest material and
energy input. In terms of kilowatt hour, the use of resources is more than
sixty times as high as in a nuclear plant. The energy return time, i.e. the
time from which a corresponding system generates net energy, i.e. the time by
which it has generated the energy required for the plant itself (including grid
integration, etc.), depends largely on the number of hours of sunshine per
year. Many energy balances simply include 1800 hours of sunshine in the bill.
In northern Germany, however, we are far from that and do not even reach half
of it. There are reasonable doubts as to whether photovoltaics in regions such
as northern Germany or Switzerland have a positive energy balance at all – if
one calculates honestly. The currently politically demanded solar obligation on
all roofs is therefore pure nonsense. Precisely because of the high energy
input required, photovoltaic modules should be installed where they promise
sufficient efficiency. [2]
With regard to the
calculation of the EROEI (energy return on energy invested), i.e. the energy
return time, it should be noted in principle: An honest balancing, which is
usually avoided, would be the so called emergy
concept, as proposed by Howard Oddum, for example. Emergy stands for embodied energy and means:
Proportionally, when balancing a plant, the entire process that was required
for its production including grid integration must be considered, i.e. in
relation to photovoltaics, the construction of the factories that produce the
excavators that shovel the sand from which the silicon is ultimately extracted
should be taken into account proportionately. Because of the volatility of renewable
energies, the necessary storage capacities would also have to be included in
the balance sheet.
The most important and
promising form of renewable energy for Germany is undoubtedly wind energy.
Here, too, distance regulations and other bureaucratic obstacles determine the
public debate. Two percent of our land area, according to the current political
requirement, should be available for wind farms. Again, you are lying to yourself: Apart from
the fact that in view of very scarce land, in view of a larger land requirement
for a (more extensive) organic farming, in view of the forests, peatlands
(moors), etc. required as CO 2 sinks there is actually competition for use, one
obscures the problem that it is not simply
about areas, but about suitable locations!
The efficiency of a wind turbine depends largely on the average wind speed at a
particular location (six meters per second is actually the requirement). Gregor
Czich (University of Kassel) already demonstrated in detail in 2004 that these
areas are scarce. Of course, the best locations tended to be used first. A
significant potential should be tapped through so-called repowering, i.e. by
replacing old wind turbines with more powerful ones at locations already in
use. The desperate search for further favorable locations for wind turbines
today has the consequence that one accepts a considerable degree of destruction
of nature, for example deforestation on a large scale – which is likely to
worsen the CO 2 balance. The example of Baden-Württemberg is instructive here:
there are no distance rules here and since 2011 a Green Prime Minister is in
charge. In his first coalition agreement (at that time still with the SPD) the
declaration of intent was included to cover 10 % of the electricity demand from
domestic wind power. After landing at around 4.4 % ten years later, the current
coalition agreement now provides for the opening of state forests.
Deforestation on a large scale in the Swabian Alb and the Black Forest! This is
what it looks like, the brave new world of renewable energies.
The offshore potential is
also fundamentally limited: it is difficult to go beyond a sea depth of more
than 30 meters, and the problem of "shading" only allows for a
certain expansion density. Studies related to Europe estimate the offshore
potential at no more than 25 % of current electricity consumption, and globally
it is estimated that there is around 5000 TWh of offshore potential. It should
therefore come as no surprise that one of the most prominent climate scientists,
who comes from a country with a lot of sea coastline (Great Britain), James
Lovelock (who recently passed away at an age of 103!), has changed into a
nuclear power advocate in view of these prospects. Gregor Czich, on the other
hand, sees the solution in huge interconnected grids that encompass North
Africa as well as the Caucasus, i.e. include about a third of the earth's land
area. He hardly reflects the fact that the necessity of setting up redundant structures
worsens the energy balance. Such fantastic blossoms result now from the
desperation of those who honestly face the limitations of potential.
To be honest, one would
also have to include in the energy balance the necessary storage capacities
that ensure that electricity is available on demand, which is indispensable for
an industrial society. The sheer scale of this task poses significant problems
for us. Pumped storage power plants have a high degree of efficiency, but for
which, however, the appropriate landscape conditions must be met. Of course,
the fundamental question of how much landscape and nature destruction we want
to accept for our energy supply is by no means trivial. So-called redox flow
batteries (based on vanadium, which is currently mainly produced as a waste
product in steel production, or lignin) are also very efficient, but require a
lot of space. Due to the already existing grid connection, the installation[3] of these
storage facilities at sites of decommissioned fossil power plants could be a
sensible possibility. Compressed air storage systems are only suitable for
short-term storage up to 48 hours, and hydrogen storage systems have a very
poor efficiency (about 20 %).
The complete
substitutability of fossil fuels by renewables is therefore illusory. We should
be prepared for the fact that we will have to cope with considerably less net
energy in the future. Even a certain increase in technical efficiency will not
change this much.
Efficiency
revolution?
Fred Luks has taken the
promises of the efficiency revolution to absurdity with a simple calculation:
If resource consumption in the industrialized nations is to fall by a factor of
10 by 2050 (which is largely consensus), and if at the same time a modest
economic growth of 2 percent per year is to be assumed, then resource
productivity (i.e. the amount of goods and services per unit of a certain
resource used) would have to grow by a factor of 27! Economic growth of 3 percent already requires
43 times the energy and resource efficiency (Luks 1997). Efficiency increases
are simply subject to the law of deminishing returns, i.e. the more efficiency
potentials have already been exhausted, the more difficult it becomes to
achieve further efficiency increases. This is also confirmed by empiric data:
In industrialized countries such as Germany or Japan, it can be observed that
after impressive increases in energy efficiency (the ratio of energy input to
gross national product) and at least a temporary relative decoupling of GDP growth from energy and resource throughput
from the mid-seventies, no further
significant efficiency successes could be achieved. In Germany, stagnation has
been observed since about 2000 (the special factor GDR, i.e. the liquidation of
the very inefficient industrial plants in eastern Germany, is the reason why
this effect is delayed compared to other industrialized countries), in Japan
even since the beginning of the nineties (Minqi Li 2008, 161–162). The most
accurate study worldwide is probably that of the two Canadians Lightfood and Green.
They estimate the global efficiency potential from the reference year 1990 to
the end of our century (i.e. by 2100!) at 250 to 330 percent (quoted in Minqi
Li 2008, 162, among others), whereby such a global view has so far included
highly inefficient regions. This is far away from the famous factor
calculations of Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker. In order to avoid this sobering
finding, the eco-capitalist optimists of purpose, such as him, always limit
themselves to impressive individual examples in their bestsellers. According to
Ted Trainer's judgment, even here 50 % is based on pure beliefs (Trainer 2007,
115–117).
There is therefore no way
around it: an absolute decoupling of the economic growth required for the
stability of the capitalist economy from energy and resource throughput is an
illusion in view of this finding. Today's level of industrial production is
incompatible with environmental sustainability. Dismantling must be initiated
as quickly and consistently as possible. In my opinion, the most urgent task is
to describe it in detail and to show how it should be designed in solidarity.
Industrial
disarmament
Let's take a closer look
at some fields:[4]
An ecological transition in transport and mobility is of the utmost importance in Germany.
Traffic is currently responsible for about 20 % of carbon dioxide emissions and
for a total energy consumption of about 750 TWh. Switching to alternative
drives is of little help. E-fuels and hydrogen-based fuel cells have a very
poor degree of efficiency. In the latter case, less than 20 % of the energy
originally used is converted into kinetic energy after the required double
conversion process. The necessary liquefaction and the transport contribute
significantly to the poor energy balance.
The additional
electricity demand for e-cars as an individual means of mass transport cannot
be covered from renewable sources, especially when one considers that carbon
dioxide neutrality in other areas requires a considerable additional
electricity demand – for example, if the oil and gas heating systems are
replaced by heat pumps.
In addition, however,
automobile production must already be included in the overall balance! 48 % of the very energy-intensive aluminium
produced in the production process (one tonne consumes 14 MWh of electricity!),
26 % of the steel and 12 % of the plastics currently flow into German
automobile production. The upstream equipment industries, the production of
corresponding production machines, robots, etc., are not even taken into
account. The electric car exacerbates this problem: the heavy battery, the
generation of which itself is already associated with considerable CO2-emissions[5]
(according to a VDI study 17 tons, by technical improvements this is to be
reduced in the EU to 12 tons by 2030), must be reduced by more lightweight
construction (more aluminum, more carbon
composite fibers) ...) so that an
electric car consumes considerably more energy and resources during production
than a comparable petrol or diesel engine. Converting the 48 million cars
currently registered in Germany, let alone the more than one billion cars
worldwide, to alternative drives is simply absurd – if only because of the
scarcity of the necessary raw materials such as lithium and cobalt. Even the german
Green Party, which tend to be optimistic in this area, assume that a maximum of 15 million electric cars
will be available in Germany after the
end of the combustion engine (2030). The German government, which was in office
until 2021, estimated the number of e-cars to only 8 million. In view of this
finding, however, the question immediately arises as to who should then be
granted the privilege of driving. The proposal of the Ecosocialism Initiative
is therefore that by 2030 at the latest, no more cars should be approved for
purely private use (except, of course, emergency vehicles, taxis including
transport taxis, company vehicles for craftsmen, jointly managed e-car pools in
remote rural areas ...). An ecological change
in transport can only mean a farewell to
motorised private transport. As the example of Switzerland shows, a
corresponding expansion of public transport can also sensibly connect remote
settlements in rural areas. However, we
cannot shift today's traffic volume to public transport on a one-to-one basis.
This would mean a multiplication of capacities that would be neither
logistically feasible nor ecologically meaningfull. Reducing the need for
mobility is a challenging structural policy task. Reducing freight traffic
through a regionalisation of the economy, which is currently also failing due
to the requirements of the EU internal market, is indispensable. In addition,
we will also have to develop a different attitude to mobility and say goodbye
to certain demands (cf. Kern 22020, 78–85; 165).
Another problem field is
the construction industry, which,
among other things, consumes 35 % of the steel we produce. Steel production is
not only associated with considerable energy consumption, but also carbon dioxide
is produced as a result of the process. Now there are technically mature
processes that replace the reducing agent coke with hydrogen and process the
pig iron obtained in this way into steel in electric arc furnaces. The
efficiency can be further increased by obtaining the hydrogen from water vapour
and using the waste heat from the blast furnaces for this purpose. But even if
all these possibilities are exhausted, this "green steel" will only
be available to us in considerably smaller quantities in view of the scarce
supply of the necessary energy (for example for hydrogen production). The
conversion of today's level of steel production to emission-free processes
requires about 130 TWh more electricity!
The Thyssen-Krupp steelworks in Duisburg alone needed 3,500 wind
turbines to convert to decarbonised processes – more than are currently
installed in NRW. Cement production – which alone has so far consumed a total
of 28 TWh of energy – is not only energy-intensive (limestone must be heated to
1400 degrees Celsius), the crushing of the limestone releases large amounts of
CO2 bound in it. Even if the necessary energy requirement is reduced
by alternative processes, this only affects the smaller part of carbon dioxide
emissions. Little known is also that sand suitable for building (desert sand is
not!) is now a very scarce raw material. An absolute
reduction in construction activity is inevitable, i.e. a complete
renunciation of prestige buildings and everything that serves the old, fossil
infrastructure. As far as the necessary living space is concerned, mechanisms
for the redistribution of existing housing must be developed politically. The laws
and regulations concerning building must be reformed in such a way that they
prevent excessive dimensions, detached single-family houses, etc. Beyond steel
and concrete, in the future we will have to rely on alternative construction
materials, especially timber construction, which, as the example of Austria
shows, is now highly developed.
For the important chemical industry, too, it is true that
it could in principle be made completely greenhouse gas neutral, that both the
process-related and the emissions caused by heat generation (for example, for
so-called steam cracking, by means of which the long hydrocarbon compounds are
split) could be completely avoided.
However, the associated additional consumption of electricity of 685 TWh has
already been pointed out above. In this area, too, there is no way around a
significant reduction in overall production. In addition to the areas already
discussed, the construction industry (22 %) and the car industry (12 %), the
packaging industry in particular currently has a considerable demand for plastics (35 %). However, it
is precisely in this area that regulatory intervention could be made very
easily: A significant proportion of today's plastic packaging (canned food of
all kinds, cleaning agents, beverage containers) could easily be replaced by
appropriate reusable systems. Non returnable plastic bottles could be banned
without further ado, as could tinplate aluminium cans. For a remaining remnant
of hard-to-avoid plastic packaging, a high recycling rate could be ensured by
prescribing color and material purity. In addition to avoiding emissions, this
would also have solved the waste problem to a considerable extent.
A return from the current
agricultural industry to a peasant
agriculture that can do without artificial fertilizers makes ammonia
production using the energy-intensive Haber-Bosch process superfluous. Only a
shutdown of production with the help of such drastic measures will enable a
completely emission-free chemical industry.
On the basis of these
three large fields, it becomes clear in which dimension we have to achieve a
dismantling of production and consumption as quickly as possible. It should be
emphasised that this is possible with the appropriate political will with the
regulatory instruments already available. Wisely, in order to take a majority
of people on this difficult path, one will start with all the measures that do
not affect anyone's quality of life, but are simply due to capitalist
mechanisms without meaning. The packaging industry has already been mentioned.
The lifetime of a large proportion of household appliances, electronic devices,
etc. could be significantly extended by effective measures to stop
"planned obsolescence", by imposing appropriate warranty periods, and
by requiring product design requirements in terms of repairability and
recyclability in the sense of the "cradle to cradle" principle, production
in this area could be significantly reduced. However, it should not be
withholded that a consistently advanced dismantling also calls into question
the consumption patterns of a large
majority of the population. This also applies to the large number of digital
devices, the possession of a smartphone, which is so common today, etc. The
scarcity of available resources results in competition for use. This means that
we will have to reach a political agreement on what we are using these
resources for: for the construction of cruise ships or for sufficient MRI
machines in our hospitals (see Kern [6]22020,
158–162).
In addition, it would be
necessary to negotiate politically which products we want to do without
completely, because they have no social or individual benefit, but on the
contrary are harmful, pathogenic, dangerous. First and foremost, of course, is the production of armaments. It is hard to beat the absurdity
that we are preparing for future wars for increasingly scarce resources with a
gigantic expenditure of resources (cf. Zumach 22005 in particular).
A ban on arms exports without exception and an end to procurement by the
Bundeswehr are not only required by peace policy, but are inevitable in view of
the scarce resources.
Of course, we must shape
this dismantling in solidarity and ensure that the material existence of the
people affected is secured. In the short term, the conversion will create a
need for skilled workers in many areas, for example for the construction of
public transport, for the energy-efficient renovation of buildings, etc. In the
long term, the exit from industrial society as we know it means an increased
need for human labour in a number of areas, such as agriculture, repair shops
and traditional crafts. In addition, there is already a significant need for
workers in the care and education sector.
In order to materially secure
the people in this enormous necessary dismantling of industrial society, Helge
Peukert has proposed to build up a social-ecological employment sector by means
of central bank money (i.e. independant of the revenues of the capitalist
growth machine). A "conditional basic income" issued by the central
bank as "gift money" (in contrast to an unconditional basic income,
this should be linked to a necessary, reasonable work performance, for example
to eliminate environmental damage, etc.) can alleviate people's existential
fears associated with these transformations and make them active protagonists
of this change (Peukert 2021, 465–479).
Literature
Alexander, Samuel/Floyd,
Joshua 2020: Das Ende der Kohlenstoff-Zivilisation. Wie wir mit weniger Energie
leben können, München.
DECHEMA/FutureCamp 2019:
Roadmap Chemie 2050. Auf dem Weg zu einer treibhausgasneutralen chemischen
Industrie, Frankfurt a. M./ München.
Kern, Bruno 22020:
Das Märchen vom grünen Wachstum. Plädoyer für eine solidarische und nachhaltige
Gesellschaft, Zürich.
Kreutzfeld, Malte:
Warnung vor neuem Kolonialismus, in: TAZ v. 27. 4. 2022.
Luks, Fred, Der Himmel
ist nicht die Grenze, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 21. 1. 1997.
Meier, Klaus 2020: Das
Klima retten. CO2-neutrale Technologien und industrieller Rückbau,
Frankfurt a. M.
Minqi Li 2008: The Rise
of China and the Demise of Capitalist Word-Economy, London.
Peukert, Helge 2021:
Klimaneutralität jetzt! Marburg.
Rohstoffhunger der
E-Autos, in: Regenwaldreport 2/2021, 6–9.
Trainer, Ted 2007:
Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain a Consumer Society, Dordrecht.
WWF (Hg.) 2019: Germanyʼs
Electric Future II. Regionalization of renewable power generation, Berlin.
Zumach, Andreas 22005:
Die kommenden Kriege. Ressourcen, Menschenrechte, Machtgewinn – Präventivkrieg
als Dauerzustand? Köln.
[1] In the following, I would like
to refer in general to Kern 22022, 40–90, where I dealt in detail
with the energy balances of renewable energies.
[2] However, the credit side of the
balance sheet has an impact only where the corresponding plant was built, so
that the impression of a successful energy transition could be maintained for
us. For the global climate, however, this makes no difference.
[3] In particular, I refer to
Alexander/ Floyd 2020, 101–103.
[4] For the following, I refer above
all to Meier 2020.
[5] With regard to the life cycle
assessment of e-cars, I refer to: Hunger for raw materials in e-cars in 2021.
[6] Elsewhere, I have explained in
detail why so-called "market-compliant instruments", i.e. the political
influence on prices by taxes, emissions trading, etc. are unsuitable to shape
this dismantling. Among many other reasons, my main argument is that these
instruments only work as far as the corresponding reductions can be achieved by
more efficient procedures. But when it is about absolute reduction of
production, this strategy turns out to be unfit. Would the CO2-price
be set so high (for example, through a corresponding design of emissions
trading) that the 1.5-degree target of global warming could still be adhered to,
then this would have led to the collapse of substantial parts of the Industrie
and the end to the business model of a large part of the corporations. It is
also often argued that a correspondingly high CO2price solely could
elegantly displace coal-fired power plants from the market, because they would
then become uneconomical compared to other types of electricity generation.
However, this argument would only be valid on the condition that alternatives
were available to a sufficient extent! Cf. above all Kern 22020, 91–115.
